J. Cogn. Neurosci.
HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
 QUICK SEARCH:   [advanced]


     


This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in PubMed
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow reprints & permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by German, T. P.
Right arrow Articles by Miller, M. B.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow PubMed Citation
Right arrow Articles by German, T. P.
Right arrow Articles by Miller, M. B.
(Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 2004;16:1805-1817.)
© 2004 The MIT Press

Neural Correlates of Detecting Pretense: Automatic Engagement of the Intentional Stance under Covert Conditions

Tim P. German, Jeffrey L. Niehaus, Meghan P. Roarty, Barry Giesbrecht and Michael B. Miller

University of California

Typically developing children begin to produce and understand pretend play between 18 and 24 months of age, and early pretense has been argued to be a candidate "core" capacity central to the deployment of representations of other peoples' mental states—"theory of mind." In a functional magnetic resonance imaging study, 16 healthy adult volunteers were imaged while watching short (5 sec) clips of actors who either performed simple everyday actions or pretended to perform a similar set of actions, under covert conditions (e.g., participants were not directed to attend to actors' mental states. There was increased activity in the medial prefrontal areas (Brodmann's areas [BA] 9/6/32, 9, and 10), inferior frontal gyrus bilaterally (BA 44, 47), temporo-parietal regions (BA 21 and 22), and parahippocampal areas, including the amygdala, when subjects viewed pretend actions as compared with real actions. This result suggests that at least some areas previously implicated in making explicit mental state judgments are also strongly activated in response to actions that call for mental state interpretation (e.g., pretense) even when there is no explicit instruction for "mind reading." This outcome is discussed in terms of accounts that propose "theory of mind" to be underwritten by automatic specialized mechanisms for the interpretation of the behavior of social agents.




This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Soc Cogn Affect NeurosciHome page
R. A. Mar, W. M. Kelley, T. F. Heatherton, and C. N. Macrae
Detecting agency from the biological motion of veridical vs animated agents
Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci, September 1, 2007; 2(3): 199 - 205.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Home page
BrainHome page
I. R. Olson, A. Plotzker, and Y. Ezzyat
The Enigmatic temporal pole: a review of findings on social and emotional processing
Brain, July 1, 2007; 130(7): 1718 - 1731.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]




HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
NEURAL COMPUTATION J COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE MIT PRESS JOURNALS
Copyright © 2004 by The MIT Press.